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ABSTRACT

In this paper, I investigate a decade of change between foreign and domestic banks in
the Chilean banking system from 2001-2013. Using the Backward and Forward
Stepwise Selection method to construct my panel regressions, I compare my findings
to those of previous author(s) found in the literature. I consider the factors that
determine interest rate spreads, and find that all banks have become more efficient
since 2000 and that non-performing loans for both domestic and foreign banks lead to
higher bank spreads. I find also, that bank concentration leads to higher spreads for
domestic banks. This paper theorizes that diversification of the banking system with
the establishment of niche banks can lead to the reduction of bank concentration when
placed in selectively highly concentrated sectors of the economy. Further,
diversification allows for increased competition in those sectors, without affecting the
other sectors of the economy and the overall health of the banking system. I find that
concentration among the Top-5 banks in the Chilean banking system has decreased
since 2000.

vii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom1 ranks 186 countries
each year based on ten economic freedoms (the index assigns a score to each
economic freedom, using a scale from 0 to 100 points), and then gives each country
an overall economic freedom score from 0 to 100 points. The world average between
1995 and 2013 is 58.9 points. Chile has been well above this since the index began.
Chile’s largest improvement based on the ten economic freedoms has been in the
Freedom from Corruption category raising its score from 50 points in 1995 to 72
points in 2013. The Heritage Foundation (2014) ranked Chile as the 7th freest
economy in the world for 2013.
In recent years, Chile has taken steps to expand its economy and to make its
country more attractive to foreign investors. In May 2010, Chile became the first
Latin American country to join the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development2 (OECD). In 2011, Chile, Peru, and Columbia combined their stock
exchanges to form the Integrated Latin American Market3 (MILA) to enhance
economic growth for all three countries. In 2012, Chile, Peru, Columbia, and Mexico
formed the Pacific Alliance4; which would make it the world’s eighth largest
economy (if treated as a single country) representing 36% of Latin America’s total
GDP and roughly 50% of its exports. The four nations have eliminated 92% of trade
tariffs between them and are working to reduce tariffs to 0 percent. The goal of the
Pacific Alliance (2012) is to build an area of deep economic integration and to move
1

gradually toward the free circulation of goods, services, capital, and persons.
Since 1995, Chile’s economy and hence its banking system, has experienced
significant growth in assets, deposits, and loans; while, the banking system has been
shrinking at a significant rate during this same time period. Brock and Suarez (2000)
define bank spreads as an attempt to capture the cost of financial intermediation – that
is, the difference between what banks charge borrowers and what they pay depositors.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the Chilean banking system and the factors
that determine bank spreads from 1995-2000 and then compare those findings to the
factors that determine bank spreads from 2001-2013.

____________________
1
The Heritage Foundation started the Index of Economic Freedom in 1995. The Index covers 10 freedoms – from property
rights to entrepreneurship – in 186 countries. More information can be found at www.heritage.org
2

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development can be found at www.oecd.org/chile/

3
The Integrated Latin American Market (MILA) was established in 2012 with Chile, Peru and Columbia combining their
individual stock exchanges. Mexico merged its stock exchange with MILA in 2014. More information can be found at
http://alianzapacifico.net/en/
4

The Pacific Alliance can be found at http://alianzapacifico.net/en/
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This paper builds on the research performed previously by other author(s); but
more so, on the research performed by Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) who conduct
an econometric analysis using panel regressions on the impact of foreign bank
participation and concentration on bank spreads for five Latin American countries;
Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, and Peru during the period 1995-2000. The
author(s) find that foreign banks are able to charge lower spreads and have lower
costs than domestic banks. Further, they find that foreign banks that acquired
domestic institutions have higher spreads than those that established de novo (startup) operations, suggesting either some market segmentation or differences in pricing
strategies to gain market share.
Dell’ Ariccia& Marquez (2003) conduct a study of Chilean banks for the same
time period 1995-2000, and find that domestic banks faced with greater competition
from foreign banks, may shift their credit allocation towards market sectors that are
more opaque, and where their competitors face greater adverse selection problems,
allowing them to retain a larger market share and charge higher margins. They refer
to this reallocation of a banks’ portfolio as a “flight to captivity”, where spreads on
bank loans are higher in markets subject to larger information asymmetries.
I find for all banks, that non-performing loans are significant. For domestic
banks, I find that non-performing loans are significant at the 1 percent level; a one
standard deviation increase in bank market share results in a .05 standard deviation
increase in bank spreads. For foreign banks, I find that non-performing loans are
significant at the 5 percent level; a one standard deviation increase in bank market
share results in a .06 standard deviation increase in bank spreads. Martinez Peria and
Mody (2004) find that administrative costs are significant at the 1 percent level for all
banks and have a large impact on bank spreads; a one standard deviation increase in
3

bank market share results in a .6 standard deviation increase in bank spreads. I find
that both domestic and foreign banks have become more efficient, and that
administrative costs are no longer significant from 2001-2013.
The Chilean Banking System, 1995-2000
In this section, we provide a comprehensive summary of the Chilean economy
between 1995 and 2000. We start with Table 1, which reports select macroeconomic
indicators. In the existing literature, Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) find that foreign
banks prefer to expand to countries where the expected rate of economic growth is
higher. Chile experienced strong economic growth from 1995–2000 with the
exception of 1999. Annual GDP growth was 10.6 percent in 1995 before it began to
taper off starting in 1996, until it reached -0.8 percent in 1999 and then reversed
course rebounding to 4.5 percent in 2000. The national savings rate decreased
slightly from 24.5 percent in 1995 to 21.2 percent in 2000. Per capita income grew
from $4,320 in 1995 to $4,920 in 2000, a 13.6 percent increase. Inflation decreased
from 8.2 percent in 1995 to 4.5 percent in 2000, while real interest rates rose from 7
percent in 1995 to 17.9 percent in 1998, but then decreased to 4.1 percent in 2000.
The United Nations (2004) reports that most of the foreign direct investment (FDI)
flowing into Chile since 1990, has been from the United States (29%), Spain (20%)
and Canada (15%), and that the largest portions of these investment funds has been
allocated to electricity (21%), banking (15%), manufacturing (12%), and
communications (9%). FDI as a percent of GDP was 4.1 percent ($US 3.5 billion) in
1995 increased to 12 percent ($US 8.7 billion) in 1999 before decreasing to 6.1
percent ($US 4.8 billion) in 2000.

4

Table 1. Chile’s Macroeconomic Indicators.
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Annual GDP Growth (%)

10.6

7.4

6.6

3.2

-0.8

4.5

National Savings Rate (%)

24.5

23.9

22.7

21.4

21.2

21.2

Per Capita Income ($US)

4320

4930

5380

5250

4910

4920

Inflation (%)

8.2

6.6

6.1

4.7

2.3

4.5

Real Interest Rates (%)

7.0

14.3

10.9

17.9

9.9

4.1

4.1

6.4

6.4

5.8

12.0

6.1

Foreign Direct Investment (%
GDP)
Source: World Bank
The Heritage Foundation (2014) finds that Chile largely maintained the
market-based institutions and economic policies established by General Augusto
Pinochet5 (Chile’s 30th President) from 1973-1990. From Table 2, we can see that
Chile improved its overall Heritage Foundation Index score from 71.2 points in 1995
to 74.7 points in 2000. Chile’s largest improvement was with its monetary policy,
increasing its score from 66.1 points in 1995 to 80.1 points in 2000. However, both
Chile’s fiscal policy and government spending scores decreased from 1995-2000.
Fiscal policy decreased from 79.4 points in 1995 to 73.2 points in 2000; while,
government spending decreased slightly from 87.0 points in 1995 to 85.5 points in
2000.

_____________________
5
General Augusto Pinochet was responsible for changing many economic reform policies based on the advice of the “Chicago
Boys”. This period of time is commonly referred to as the “Miracle of Chile”.
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Table 2. Chile’s Overall, Fiscal, Monetary, and Government Spending Scores.
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Chile’s Overall Score

71.2

72.6

75.9

74.9

74.1

74.7

Fiscal Policy

79.4

89.8

73.5

73.0

73.0

73.2

Monetary Policy

66.1

68.0

75.6

77.1

78.7

80.1

Government Spending

87.0

85.9

86.6

88.1

87.1

85.5

Source: The Heritage Foundation
Starting in 2019, Basel III requires all financial institutions to have a minimum
tier 1 capital ratio of 6 percent and a capital to risk-weighted asset (CAR) ratio of 10.5
percent. As we can see in Table 3, the Chilean banking system has been well above
these requirements since 1998. In 1998, CAR is 10.6 percent and tier 1 capital is 12.5
percent. In 2000, CAR is 13.3 percent and tier 1 capital is 10.5%. Non-performing
loans increased from 1.2 percent in 1997 to 1.9 percent in 2000. Chilean banks return
on equity decreased to its lowest level of 9.4 percent in 1999, but increased to 12.7
percent in 2000. The banking system’s liquid assets increased from 16.6 percent in
1997 to 16.9 percent in 2000. Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find that banks that
either decide or are required by regulation to hold a high proportion of their assets in
the form of liquid assets seem to charge higher spreads. The author(s) find liquid
assets to be significant at the 1 percent level for all banks from 1995-2000. I find that
liquid assets are still significant for foreign banks from 2001-2013; however, the
impact on spreads is small; a one standard deviation increase in liquidity raises
spreads by.008 standard deviation. Liquidity is no longer significant for domestic
banks, however.

6

Table 3. Financial Soundness Indicators (%).
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted
Assets (CAR)

n.a.

n.a

n.a.

12.5

13.5

13.3

Tier 1 Capital

n.a.

n.a.

11.0

10.6

10.5

10.5

Non-Performing Loans

1.0

1.0

1.2

1.6

1.8

1.9

Return on Assets

0.8

1.1

1.0

0.9

0.7

1.0

Equity

13.9

16.6

13.7

11.5

9.4

12.7

Liquidity

n.a.

n.a.

16.6

15.2

17.7

16.9

Source: Authur’s calculations
IMF Chile: Financial system stability assessment 2004
Central Bank of Chile
Chile’s banking system reaped significant growth from 1995-2000. Table 4,
shows that foreign banks share of loans grew substantially from 13.7 percent to 45.1
percent during this time period. The top-3 banks market share increased 12 percent
from 36.6 percent in 1995 to 41.1 percent in 2000. The top-5 banks market share
increased 19 percent from 51.9 percent in 1995 to 61.8 percent in 2000. Also, the
Herfindahl index (HHI) which measures market concentration, increased from 789
points in 1995 to 923 points in 2000. The total number of banks decreased from 31 to
27 in Chile during the same time period; while, the number of foreign banks stayed
relatively constant at 17.

7

Table 4. Chile’s Banking System.
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Foreign Bank Share of Loans (%)

13.7

16.7

20.3

21.5

37.7

45.1

Top-3 Bank Share of Loans (%)

36.6

35.7

42.5

42.1

41.5

41.1

Top-5 Bank Share of Loans (%)

51.9

52.6

62.5

62.1

61.9

61.8

Herfindahl Index (Loans)

789

796

983

973

961

923

Number of Banks

31

31

29

29

29

27

Number of Foreign Banks

17

17

17

17

18

17

Source: Martinez Peria and Mody (2004)
Note: A foreign bank is defined to have at least 50 percent foreign ownership.
Note: A HHI of less than 1500 points is considered to be un-concentrated and a
highly competitivebanking system.
Note: The total number of foreign banks excludes Banco Estado, Chile’s National
Bank.
Chilean bank spreads for 1995-2000 varied between 4.5 and 5 percent except
for in 2000 when domestic banks spreads rose to 6 percent. Martinez Peria and Mody
(2004) find that foreign and domestic spreads appear to move very much in tandem in
Chile. Their study shows that macroeconomic factors or similar cost structures may
be affecting all banks in the system, as well as the possibility that foreign and
domestic banks are competing with each other for customers. Brock and Suarez
(2000) explore the determinants of bank spreads in Latin America (including Chile),
during the mid-1990s and find that banks that orient their services towards retail
operation involve the establishment of a larger number of branches, equipment, and
personnel to serve the retail customer. These larger costs usually translate into a
higher bank spread. More so, than banks that are more oriented towards wholesale
markets. I suspect that many foreign banks in Chile are motivated to merge or acquire
domestic banks, (who have established branches, equipment, and personnel in the
8

retail marketplace), as a way to increase profits much faster and perhaps less costly
than trying to compete as de novo retail operations. In return, domestic banks have
access to new products and services, better technology, and a foothold in international
markets through the merger of a foreign bank. Figure 1, shows that domestic and
foreign bank spreads move very much in tandem. With the number of mergers and
acquisitions since 1981, it is very likely that both domestic and foreign banks are
competing for the same customers.

7.0%
6.0%

6.0%
5.0%

4.6%

4.0%

Domestic

3.0%

Foreign

2.0%
1.0%
0.0%
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Time

Figure 1. Chilean Bank Spreads 1995-2000
Source: Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004
The Chilean Banking System, 2000-2013
We now turn our attention to the Chilean banking system from 2001-2013 to
investigate a decade of change between domestic and foreign banks and their impact
on spreads. As we can see from Table 5, Chile showed strong macroeconomic
indicators from 2001-2013 other than for a short period after the 2008 world financial
9

crisis. In 2009, annual GDP growth and inflation dipped to -1.0 percent and -2.6
percent respectively. However, both made a quick recovery in 2010 with GDP
growth reaching 5.8 percent and inflation returning to 3.0 percent. The national
savings rate bounced between 20.8 percent in 2003 and 25.3 percent in 2006 before
leveling off to 21.1 percent in 2013. Per capita income increased greatly from $4,760
in 2001 to a high of $15, 230 in 2013 while real interest rates rose to a high of 12.7%
in 2008 and then retreated back to 7.4% in 2013. FDI increased from 5.8 percent of
GDP ($US 4.2 billion) in 2001 to 7.3 percent of GDP ($US 20 billion) in 2013. From
a macroeconomic perspective, it appears that the Chilean economy came away from
the 2008 financial crisis virtually unscathed.
Table 5. Chile’s Macroeconomic Indicators.
2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

Annual GDP Growth (%)

3.3

4.0

5.6

5.2

-1.0

5.8

4.1

National Savings Rate (%)

21.5

20.8

23.5

24.7

22.4

22.3

21.1

Per Capita Income ($US)

4760

4570

6250

8630

9940

12290

15230

Inflation (%)

2.6

1.1

3.7

7.8

-2.6

3.0

1.5

Real Interest Rates (%)

7.8

0.3

-0.8

3.7

3.3

5.5

7.4

Foreign Direct Investment (% GDP)

5.8

5.5

5.6

7.2

7.5

9.3

7.3

Source: World Bank
Note: Table (even years) is available in the Appendix.

From 2001-2009, the Heritage Foundation (2014) finds that Chile continued to
use the market-based institutions and economic policies established by General
Augusto Pinochet. In 2010, Sebastian Pinera6 was elected as Chile’s 36th President.
Shortly after his election, he raised corporate taxes and is considered to be more
conservative than was General Pinochet. Viewing table 6, we can see that Chile’s
Heritage Foundation Index overall score improved further from 75.1 points in 2001 to
10

its highest score of 79 points in 2013. Chile’s fiscal and monetary policy scores
increased as well during this same time period. The index score for Chile’s fiscal
policy increased from 73.7 points in 2001 to 77.6 points in 2013, and Chile’s
monetary policy index score increased from 82.4 points in 2001 to 84.6 points in
2013. Chile’s index score for government spending decreased slightly from 84.1
points in 2001 to 83.7 points in 2013.
Table 6. Chile’s Overall, Fiscal, Monetary, and Government Spending Scores.
2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

Chile’s Overall Score

75.1

76.0

77.8

77.7

78.3

77.4

79.0

Fiscal Policy

73.7

75.0

78.3

78.8

78.2

77.7

77.6

Monetary Policy

82.4

83.0

84.4

79.8

77.3

77.9

84.6

Government Spending

84.1

81.8

84.8

87.9

90.1

86.6

83.7

Source: The Heritage Foundation
From 2001-2013, the Chilean banking system continued to show strong
financial soundness indicators even in the wake of the 2008 world financial crisis.
From Table 7, we can see that CAR and tier 1 ratios remained well above Basel III
requirements from 2001-2013. The banking system’s liquid assets during this time
period reached a high of 21.3 percent in 2009 before declining to a low of 13.2
percent in 2013. Both return on assets (ROA) and equity bounced back from their
1999 lows to soar to their highest levels in 2011 with ROA reaching 1.6 percent and
equity reaching 20.8 percent. The banking system reached a new high (since 1997)
for non-performing loans of 3.0 percent in 2009 before decreasing to 2.1 percent in
2013.

_______________
6

Sebastian Pinera is a businessman and politician who served as Chile’s President from 2010-2014.
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Table 7. Financial Soundness Indicators.
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Regulatory Capital to RiskWeighted Assets (CAR)

12.7

14.5

13.0

12.2

14.3

13.9

13.0

Tier 1 Capital

9.9

11.5

10.0

9.4

10.9

10.1

9.7

Non-Performing Loans

1.8

2.0

0.9

0.8

3.0

2.3

2.1

Return on Assets

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.1

1.2

1.6

1.5

Equity

17.7

16.4

17.0

15.7

15.2

20.8

18.4

Liquid Assets

17.2

16.9

19.8

15.5

21.3

15.2

13.2

Source: IMF Chile: Financial system stability assessment 2004
IMF Chile: Financial system stability assessment 2011
IMF Chile: Country Report Chie No. 14/218. 2014
St. Louis Federal Reserve
World Bank
Author’s calculations
Note: Table (even years) is available in the Appendix.
In Table 8, we observe that Chile’s banking system concentrated further from
2001-2013 with the total number of banks decreasing from 25 to 22 and the number
of foreign banks decreasing from 15 to 12. Foreign banks share of loans grew slightly
from 43.9 percent to a high of 52.1 percent in 2011, before decreasing to 46.1 percent
in 2013. Concentration of the top-3 and top-5 banks market share of loans continued
to increase to record highs of 56.1 percent and 76.0 percent in 2007 before decreasing
(possibly due to the 2008 World Financial Crisis) to 41.5 percent and 59.7 percent
respectively in 2013.
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Table 8. Chile’s Banking System.
2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

Total Number of Banks

25

25

25

25

24

23

22

Number of Foreign Banks

15

13

13

14

13

13

12

43.9

44.4

41

47.8

48.7

52.1

46.1

Top-3 Bank Share of Loans (%)

42

50.8

51.3

56.1

44.4

45.1

41.5

Top-5 Bank Share of Loans (%)

61.7

69.2

73.3

76.0

63.5

63.1

59.7

Foreign Bank Share of Loans (%)

Source: Superintendence of Banks
Author's calculations
Note: Table (even years) is available in the Appendix.
Note: The total number of foreign banks excludes Banco Estado, Chile’s
National Bank.
Note: A foreign bank is defined to have at least 50 percent foreign
Ownership Bank.

Figure 2, shows that foreign and domestic spreads continue to move very
much in tandem in Chile as they did from 1995-2000. Foreign bank spreads lagged
domestic bank spreads in the early 2000s, but their spreads have been higher than
those of domestic banks since 2009. Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) theorize that
macroeconomic factors or similar cost structures may be affecting all banks in the
system, as well as the possibility that foreign and domestic banks are competing with
each other for the same customers. The author(s) do not find inflation, real GDP
growth, or real market interest rates to be significant from 1995-2000. I find that real
GDP growth to be significant at the 10 percent level for domestic banks only;
however, the impact on spreads is very small. A one standard deviation increase in
real GDP growth lowers spreads by.00000003 standard deviation. Also, I find that
inflation and real market interest rates are not significant for either model. Based on
the results of Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) and my own results, it is a possibility
13

that foreign and domestic banks are competing with each other for the same
customers.

Bank Spreads
4.0%

3.4%

3.5%

Foreign banks

Spread %

3.0%

2.3%

2.5%

Domestic banks
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%

Year

Figure 2. Chilean Bank Spreads 2000-2013
Source: Author’s calculations
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CHAPTER II
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
I use panel data with time fixed-effects to explain changes in spreads over time
for my empirical analysis, to study the impact that foreign banks have had on Chilean
bank spreads from 2001-2013. To estimate the changes in Chilean bank spreads, I
build on the research conducted by Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) who define the
dependent variable - bank spread, as the total interest received from banks on loans
divided by average loans, minus total interest paid on deposits divided by average
deposits.
Spreadi,t (domestic) = a0 + a1Administrative Costsi,t + a2Crisisi,t + a3Equityi,t
+ a4Fiscali,t + a5GDP Growth Ratei,t+ a6Governmenti,t + a7Inflationi,t
+ a8Liquidityi,t + a9NPL’si,t + a10NPL’si,t + a11Real Interest Ratesi,t
+ a12Top-5 Loansi,t+ ei,t
Spreadi,t(Foreign) = a0 + a1Administrative Costsi,t + a2Crisisi,t + a3Equityi,t + a4FDIi,t
+ a5Governmenti,t+ a6Inflationi,t + a7Liquidityi,t + a8Monetaryi,t
+ a9NPL’si,t+ a10Pensioni,t + a11ROAi,t + a12Top-5 Loansi,t + ei,t
Where i refers to the bank id, and t refers to the time period under
consideration.
Using the Backward and Forward Stepwise Selection method, I reduce my
independent macroeconomic, government policies, government spending, and bank-
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specific variables from 49 to 12 for my domestic and foreign bank models. Data for
my macroeconomic variables was obtained from the World Bank statistical database.
Data for my government policies and spending variables was obtained from the
Heritage Foundation; while, data for my bank-specific variables was obtained from
various sources cited and using bank balance sheet and income statements from the
Chilean Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF) for years 20012013.
Macroeconomic Variables
Inflation is defined by the World Bank as the ratio of GDP in current local
currency divided by GDP in constant local currency. Chile’s inflation rate averaged
5.3 percent from 1995-2000 and 5.1 percent from 2001-2013. In the literature, Brock
and Suarez (2000) find the inflation rate to be significant at the 5 percent level and
that a higher inflation rate raises the bank spread in Chile. However, I find that the
inflation rate is no longer significant for the Chilean banking system from 2001-2013.
The 2008 world financial crisis variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 for all
banks in 2008; otherwise, it takes the value 0 for each year between 2001 and 2013. I
suspect that the Crisis would have some affect on banks spreads for Chilean banks
and may have been the cause for higher bank spreads in 2008 and 2009. However,
my preliminary investigation shows that the 2008 world financial crisis variable is not
significant for Chilean banks during this time period.
The World Bank defines foreign direct investment (FDI) as net inflows (new
investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign
investors, and is divided by GDP. In 1995, FDI was US$3 billion and in 2013, FDI
had increased to US$20 billion. Chile’s record high for FDI is US$28 billion, set in
2012. The International Monetary Fund (2003) finds that International banks both
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help to originate, as well as widen the market for FDI financing through syndication
to institutional investors and sales of loans in secondary markets. All of Chile’s
foreign banks are considered to be international banks. Based on the IMF’s findings,
I would expect the FDI variable to be significant for foreign banks, more so, than for
domestic banks. I find that FDI is not significant for domestic banks; however, I find
that FDI is significant for foreign banks at the 10 percent level and raises spreads, but
the impact is very small.
The pension variable is defined as short-term (usually a month to several
years) bank term-deposits from Chilean Pension Funds. Ahumada and Cetorelli
(2003) conduct a study from 1994 to 2001 on the effect of cross-industry ownership
on pricing behavior of deposit and lending operations of banking institutions in Chile.
The author(s) find that banks affiliated (ownership) with a Chilean Pension Fund,
exhibit a substantially larger deposit base and enjoy higher spreads overall than
unaffiliated banks. Since 2001, four foreign banks continue to have an affiliation with
Pension Funds. I incorporate the pension variable into my foreign bank model to see
if foreign banks still enjoy higher spreads from 2001-2013. My analysis shows that
foreign banks no longer enjoy higher spreads because of their affiliation with Pension
Funds. This may be one reason that explains why all the foreign banks in Chile have
sold their pension funds.
The World Bank defines real GDP growth rate as a measure of economic
growth adjusted for inflation. In the literature, Chortareas, Garza-Garcia, and
Girardone, (2011) conduct a study to in Latin America (including Chile) with a
sample of 2,300 bank observations covering the period 1999-2006 and find that
higher GDP growth in Chile lowers bank spreads. The author(s) mention that this
implies that for Chile and other Latin American countries, a better macroeconomic
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environment decreases spreads, possibly by reducing the lending rate as a result of the
lower credit risk of corporate and private borrowers. Although, I find that real GDP
growth is negatively correlated with spreads for domestic banks; this variable is no
longer significant at the 10 percent level.
The World Bank defines the real interest rate as the lending interest rate
adjusted for inflation. Gelos (2006) examines the determinants of bank interest
margins using bank and country level data from 85 countries, including 14 Latin
American economies from 1999-2002. The author(s) finds that the level of interest
rates are strongly positively associated with higher spreads. I find that the real
interest rate is no longer significant for domestic banks.
Fiscal, Monetary, and Government Spending Variables
I incorporate two variables into my domestic bank model, Chile’s fiscal
freedom and government spending scores. For my foreign bank model, I incorporate
Chile’s monetary freedom score. These three variables can be found in the Heritage
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. The Heritage Foundation defines fiscal
freedom as a measure of the tax burden imposed by government. It includes both the
direct tax burden in terms of the top tax rates on individual and corporate incomes and
the overall amount of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. Tables 9 and 10 show that
Chile’s fiscal freedom policy score in 1995 was 79.4 percent. In 2013, Chile’s score
had fallen to 77.6 percent. The foundation defines monetary freedom as a measure of
price stability. Chile’s monetary freedom policy score in 1995 was 66.1 percent. In
2013, Chile’s score had increased to 84.6 percent. The foundation defines
government spending as government expenditures including consumption and
transfers. Chile’s government spending score was 87.0 percent in 1995. In 2013,
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Chile’s score had fallen to 83.7 percent. My preliminary results do not find these
variables to be significant at the 10 percent level for either model.
Bank-Specific Variables
The administrative costs variable is the ratio of administrative costs including
payroll, commissions, and other operating expenses divided by total assets. Martinez
Peria and Mody (2004) find that administrative costs are significant at the 1 percent
level between 1995 and 2000 for all banks, but especially among foreign banks in the
Chilean banking system. The author(s) find that administrative costs have a large
impact on bank spreads: a one standard deviation change in administrative costs for
all banks results in a .652 standard deviation change increase in spreads. We would
expect foreign banks to have high start-up costs (especially as a de novo operation or
from a merger or acquisition of a domestic bank) when first entering the banking
system, but become more efficient like their parent companies over time. Claessens,
Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) use 7900 bank observations from 80 countries
from 1988-1995 and find that banks with high overhead costs exhibit a lack of
efficient management and that foreign bank entry seems to improve the efficiency of
domestic banks over time. My analysis shows that both domestic and foreign banks
are more efficient overall and that administrative costs are no longer significant for
either, between 2001 and 2013.
The non-performing loans variable is the ratio of non-performing loans (90
days past due) divided by total loans. In the literature, Brock and Suarez (2000)
explore the determinants of bank spreads in Latin America (including Chile) during
the mid-1990s and find that except for Columbia, non-performing loans are associated
with lower spreads. This result could be the result of inadequate provisioning for loan
losses or it could reflect the fact that banks with a high proportion of bad loans may
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lower spreads (raise deposit rates and lower loan rates) as a way of trying to grow out
of their troubles. Our preliminary investigation finds that the non-performing loans
are significant at the 1 percent level for domestic banks and significant at the 5
percent level for foreign banks from 2001-2013. For domestic banks, a one standard
deviation increase in non-performing loans results in a .05 standard deviation increase
in bank spreads. For foreign banks, a one standard deviation increase in nonperforming loans results in a .06 standard deviation increase in bank spreads.
The liquidity variable is the ratio of liquid assets (cash and central bank reserves)
divided by total assets. This ratio is used to measure the bank’s ability to pay its
short-term obligations. Chile’s banking system has had liquidity ratios above 15
percent since 1997. It has just been recently that they have fallen under 15 percent, to
13.3 percent in 2012 and 13.2 percent in 2013. Shortly after the 2008 world financial
crisis, Chile’s banks increased their liquidity ratios to the highest levels in a decade. In
2009 the ratio was 21.3 percent and in 2010 the ratio was 20.5 percent. Claessens and
van Horen (2012) conduct a study of 137 countries (including Chile) over the period
of 1995-2009 and find that foreign banks have more liquidity than domestic banks do.
The author(s) suggest that foreign banks may be operating more conservatively
compared to domestic banks. I find also, that foreign banks in Chile have higher
liquidity ratios than domestic banks. Liquidity for foreign banks is significant at the 1
percent level; a one standard deviation increase in liquidity results in a .008 standard
deviation increase in bank spreads. However, for domestic banks liquidity is not
significant from 2001-2013.
From a profitability standpoint, I incorporate both Return on Assets and Equity
variables in both models. The return on assets (ROA) variable is the ratio of net
income divided by total assets. This ratio is used to measure how efficient bank’s are
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at using their assets to generate profits. The equity variable is the ratio of bank capital
plus reserves divided by total assets. This ratio measures the bank’s long-term ability
to grow and pay back its debt. Moguillansky, Studart and Vergara (2004) conduct a
study of foreign banks in Latin America (including Chile) from 1990-2001 and find
that there are no statistically significant differences in profitability between domestic
and foreign banks, whether measured as the return on assets or as the return on equity.
My analysis results are similar to those of the author(s) for domestic banks; however,
I find that both ROA and equity are significant at the 5 percent level and both increase
spreads for Chile’s foreign banks from 2001-2013.
Table 9. Panel Regressions for Chilean Domestic Bank Spreads.
Variable

P-Value

T-Statistic

Increase/Decrease in Spreads

Administation Costs

.146

-1.46

-.0000000009

Crisis

.165

-1.40

-.00093

Equity

.951

-0.06

-.00011

Fiscal

.799

-0.25

-.000002

GDP Growth Rate

.088

-1.73

-.000000031

Government

.276

1.09

.00007

Inflation

.328

-0.98

-.00005

Liquidity

.300

1.04

.00037

Non-Performing Loans

.000

3.84

.04755

Market Interest Rates

.201

1.29

.00007

Return on Assets

.623

0.49

.00598

Top-5 Market Share (Loans)

.087

1.73

.00295

R-Squared

0.56

F-Test

5.91

Note: P-Values in bold are significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level.
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The Top-5 bank market share of loans variable is defined as the share of loans
held by the five largest banks in the system. Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find
that both the top-5 market share of loans and the HHI variables are significant at the 1
percent level for domestic banks. The author’s do not find either variable to be
significant for foreign banks between 1995 and 2000. My preliminary results show
that the top-5 variable is significant at the 10 percent level for domestic banks
between 2001 and 2013. A one standard deviation increase in the top-5 bank market
share results in a .003 standard deviation increase in bank spreads. However, the HHI
variable is not significant.
Table 10. Panel Regressions for Chilean Foreign Bank Spreads.
Variable

P-Value

T-Statistic

Administation Costs

.818

0.23

.00000000016

Crisis

.987

-0.02

-.000017

Equity

.018

2.40

.00921

FDI

.054

1.95

.00000012

Government

.504

0.67

.00012

Inflation

.890

-0.14

-.000021

Liquidity

.000

3.73

.00838

Monetary

.201

1.29

.00015

Non-Performing Loans

.026

2.26

.05948

Pension Term Deposits

.345

0.95

.000091

Return on Assets

.052

1.97

.03536

Top-5 Market Share (Loans)

.946

0.07

.00024

R-Squared

0.32

F-Test

Increase/Decrease in Spreads

11.39

Note: P-Values in bold are significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels.
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Has the Chilean Banking System Become More Concentrated?
Figure 3, shows that the gap between the total number of banks and the
number of foreign banks has been steadily getting narrower since 1982. In 1982,
there were 43 banks in the Chilean banking system, but in 2013 there were just 22
banks remaining. In 1982, foreign banks represented 44% of total banks while in 2013
foreign banks represented 55% of total banks. The Chilean banking system has
experienced explosive growth in banking assets, going from US $63 billion in 1995 to
US $304 billion in 2013, a 382% increase. Loans have grown at a faster pace than
assets, growing from US $27 billion in 1995 to US $234 billion in 2013, a 766%
increase.
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Figure 3. The Chilean Banking System.
Source: Superintendence of Banks
Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find that the HHI, top-3 bank share, and the
top-5 bank market share of loans is significant at the 1 percent level for domestic
banks. The author(s) find that concentration leads to higher Chilean bank spreads
from 1995-2000. In the literature, Karasulu (2007) conducts a study of 29 emerging
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economies banking systems (including Chile) from 1995-2004 and finds that the
Chilean banking system is concentrated, but the degree of competition is smaller than
other emerging economies in the sample. The author(s) finds also, that Chilean banks
have spreads that are about 2 percentage points higher than the rest of the sample. My
preliminary results show that the top-5 largest bank with the largest share of the loans
market is significant at the 10 percent level for domestic banks between 2001 and
2013. However, I find that the top-3 largest bank7 variable is not significant for
domestic banks for this same time period. For foreign banks, none of the variables
are significant. My results show that concentration levels have decreased in the
Chilean banking system, especially for domestic banks from 2001-2013.
In 1997, Chile’s Congress updated the banking laws to make foreign bank
entry easier. Also, the International Monetary Fund (2004) finds that in 2001, the
Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF) lowered minimum paidin capital requirements, in order to promote the development of niche banks and
improve competition. Between 2002 and 2004, six new foreign niche banks entered
the market to compete in the retail, investment, foreign exchange, and leasing &
factoring financing segments. During this short time period from 2002-2004, the total
number of banks reversed course for the first time since 1995 and increased from 24
to 26. However, because of multiple mergers during this same time period, the total
number of banks did not increase to 30.

______________________
7

The top-3 largest bank variable has a p-value of 0.107 when substituted for the top-5 largest bank variable.
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Figure 4, shows concentration levels of loans increasing for both the top-three
and top-five largest banks from 1995-2007 before starting to decrease in 2008. It may
well be that the 2008 world financial crisis helped reverse the course of loan growth
among the top-3 and top-5 largest banks. The figure shows the top-3 and top-5 largest
banks losing market share back to 1997 levels through 2013.
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
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0.0%

Top-3 banks

Top-5 banks

Figure 4. Concentration levels in the Chilean banking system.
(Share of loans for the top-3 and top-5 largest banks, in percentages)
Source: Author’s calculations

Although, I believe that the 2008 world crisis may have had some effect on the
number of loans decreasing from 2008; it may be possible that the new banking laws
for establishing de novo banking operations in sectors of the economy that are highly
concentrated, may have more to do with the number of loans decreasing from 2008.
By selectively placing new banks in sectors of the economy that are highly
concentrated, this increased competition allows for loans to be more evenly
distributed across banks in those sectors, and thus allowing concentration in those
sectors to decrease over time.
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AFP’s
In 1981, Chile switched from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded defined
contribution pension plan. The new pension plan was no longer managed by the
government but managed by private pension fund administrative companies called
(Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones8, or AFPs). AFP’s offered one fund
(referred to as fund C) in 1981 and were required by law9 to invest employee
contributions in low risk domestic assets such as time deposits and government bonds.
This new defined contribution pension plan requires employees to contribute 10% of
their monthly earnings plus administrative fees and premiums for disability and
survivors’ insurance to their individual accounts (OECD, 2011).
According to the Superintendence of Pensions10 or SAFP (2010), the Chilean
Pension System experienced high concentration through multiple mergers and
acquisitions with the number of AFP’s decreasing from fifteen in 1995 to only eight
in 2000. Table 11, shows that during the 1995-2000 time periods, AFP fund assets
grew from $32.8 billion to $51.7 billion making the pension system the second-largest
contributor to the Chilean banking system behind banks. Assets as a percent of GDP
grew from 36.5% in 1995 to 50.6% in 2000. Fund C returned an annual real rate of
return of -2.5% in 1995 and an annual real rate of return of 16.2% in 1999. While net
commissions paid by employees decreased slightly from 3.2% to 2.7% for this same
time period, administrative costs rose from .03% to 1.17%. Also, bank term deposits
in 1995 were 5.3% but grew rapidly to 18.7% by 2000.
________________
8

In 1981, Chile replaced its public pension with privately managed individual accounts. These private firms are called
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones or (AFPs).
Ahumada and Cetorelli (2003) discuss in their paper that Chilean pension funds are required by law to invest a fraction of their
managed funds in bank deposits.
10
Superintendence of Pensions (SAFP) is the Chilean Pensions Supervisor who regulates the Chilean Pension System. More
information can be found at http://www.spensiones.cl/
9
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Table 11. AFP Indicators 1995-2000
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Number of AFP's

15

12

12

9

8

8

AFP Term Deposits (%)

5.3

4.2

10.7

13.6

16.1

18.7

-2.5

3.5

4.8

-1.1

16.3

4.4

3.1

3

3.0

2.7

2.6

2.5

Administrative Costs (% of fund)

0.03

0.21

0.18

0.25

0.47

1.17

Pension Fund Assets (billion US$)

32.8

34.9

38.2

39.6

48.1

51.7

Pension Assets (% of GDP)

36.5

37.4

39.0

40.2

49.1

50.6

HHI

13.1

13.4

13.9

16.9

20.8

20.7

Average Real Rate of Return for Fund C (%)
Net Commission Paid by Employees (%)

Source: Superintendencia de Pensiones 2010
Central Bank of Chile
Ahumada and Cetorelli (2003) find that banks with a pension fund affiliation
(ownership of the fund), offer higher deposits rates and charge higher loan rates than
unaffiliated banks. Also, their interest rate spreads are higher than average. By
2001, the number of pension funds had been reduced to seven, with the four largest
funds owned by foreign banks namely, Banco Santander, Citibank, Banco Penta, and
BBVA. The author(s) find that affiliated banks can count on a more stable supply of
deposits, which would support a more aggressive lending strategy. Taking on riskier
investment projects could generate a higher rate of return on the lending portfolio,
together with broader interest margins and higher profitability. Their research shows
that from 1995-2001, affiliated banks enjoyed much higher AFP pension fund
deposits than did non-affiliated banks.
In 2002, a new federal regulation was put in place that required AFP’s to offer
three additional funds, referred to as Funds B, C, D, and E which vary by different
degrees of risk. AFP’s may also offer Fund A, which has the highest degree of risk
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with a maximum limit in equities of up to 80%. Fund E, has the lowest risk with zero
equities. Fund C, continues to be the original fund that was established in 1981. The
International Monetary Fund (2011) finds that the Chilean pension system has
averaged a little over 9 percent average historic real rate of return since 1981.
However, going forward, achieving long-term real returns in the 6 percent range may
prove challenging.
In 2008, Chile’s President Michelle Bachelet11 (2006-2010) applied pressure
to Congress to pass pension reform Law 20.255.12 The new regulations were put in
place to increase AFP competition and reduce high pension fund costs. Kritzer,
Barbara E. (2008) finds that pension fees as a percentage of member contributions in
2008 was 14.6%, making Chile’s pension fund administration fees the third highest in
Latin America behind Argentina and Peru. The law mandates that:

•

AFP’s must eliminate their fixed monthly administration fees they charge
to their members.

•

AFP’s must eliminate fees when members transfer their balances from
another AFP.

•

All AFP’s must offer a single fee based on the percentage of member’s
earnings.

•

All new members entering the pension system will be assigned to the
AFP with the lowest fees for a 2 year period.

•

New regulations allow AFP’s to outsource most of their administrative
functions to help improve efficiency.

•

Insurance companies are now allowed to enter the market by setting up
AFP subsidiaries.
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Table 12, shows that from 2000-2013, the Chilean pension system
concentrated further with the number of AFP’s decreasing from seven to six. Pension
fund assets grew from $51.7 billion to $163.9 billion while pension assets as a percent
of GDP grew from 50.6% to 62.2%. During the 2008 world economic crisis, Fund
C’s average real rate of return was -18.9%, but bounced back in 2009 with a return of
12.6%. The fund’s return in 2013 was .7%. Net commissions paid by employees
decreased from 2.5% to 1.5%, while administrative costs increased from 1.16% to
1.25% over the same time period. Term deposits were 18.7% in 2000 but fell to 4.8%
in 2013.
Table 12. AFP Indicators.
2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

7

7

6

6

5

6

6

17.5

15.0

20.8

18.4

7.5

6.7

4.8

Average Real Rate of Return for Fund C (%)

6.7

10.6

4.6

5.0

12.6

-3.8

0.7

Net Commission Paid by Employees (%)

2.4

2.4

2.4

2.4

1.6

1.6

1.5

Administrative Costs (% of fund)

1.16

1.14

1.14

1.25

1.25

n.a.

n.a.

Pension Fund Assets (billion US$)

56.9

69.6

85.1

110.8

119

134.9

164

Pension Assets (% of GDP)

53.2

57.7

57.9

64.4

62.0

58.0

62.2

HHI

20.9

21.4

21.4

21.6

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Number of AFP's
AFP Term Deposit’s (%)

Source: Superintendencia de Pensiones 2010
Central Bank of Chile
OECD Stat Extracts
Note: The complete table (includes even years) is available in the Appendix.

In 1995, the limit that pension funds could invest internationally was only 6
percent. In 2013, the limit has increased to 15 percent for Fund C. Although AFP’s
could invest more funds oversea during the 2000’s, bank term deposits didn’t
decrease until after the 2008 world economic crisis. In 2009, AFP’s reduced their
term deposits from 20 percent to 7.7 percent. The International Monetary Fund
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(2014) finds that banks reduced their dependence on institutional deposits from 2009–
2011, while mutual funds have become the biggest institutional depositor during this
same time period. Deposits from mutual funds have on average a shorter maturity
than those from pension funds. At the end of 2011, AFP term deposits were just 6.7
percent while mutual funds deposits13 accounted for 21 percent of total term deposits
in the Chilean banking system.
Ahumada and Cetorelli (2003) find also, that the process of deregulation,
which has made pensions funds less dependent on domestic sources of investment,
seem to have reduced the importance for banks to tie themselves to a pension fund via
common ownership. Shortly after Law 20.255 was passed in 2008, Banco Santander
sold A.F.P. Bansander to the ING Group. Citibank sold its 40.23 percent indirect
ownership in A.F.P. Habitat, Chile’s 2nd largest pension fund to Sociedad de
Inversiones y Servicios la Construcción, S.A. (Invesco) and Inversiones Provisionales
S.A. (Inpresa) in 2010. Banco Penta sold A.F.P. Cuprum, Chile’s 3rd largest pension
fund to Principal Financial Group in 2012. Lastly, BBVA sold A.F.P. Provida,
Chile’s largest pension fund to MetLife in 2013.
Although Banco Santander, Citibank, Banco Penta, and BBVA are no longer
affiliated with AFP’s, I incorporated pension fund term deposits into my foreign bank
model from 2001-2013, because of the significant influence term deposits had on
foreign bank spreads from 1994-2001. My preliminary findings show that pension
fund term deposits are no longer significant from 2001-2013.
_____________________________________
11

12

Chile’s President Michelle Bachelet served from 2006-2010.
Chile’s pension reform Law 20.255 was passed March 2008 was established to include more workers in Chile and to promote

more competition among pension fund management companies.
13

IMF: Chile selected issues, July 2014.
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There may be many reasons to explain why Banco Santander, Citibank, Banco
Penta, and BBVA sold their AFP pension fund businesses. It is certainly possible that
Law 20.255 will increase AFP competition and reduce high pension fund costs over
the long run. If this is the case however, then pension funds profitability will be
reduced. Also, with stronger regulations regarding new members, if an AFP does not
have the lowest fees at the beginning of every two-year window; the AFP is at risk of
not growing its membership on a consistent basis. AFP’s that do not consistently lead
with the lowest fees will see their membership and assets decline over time.
Are Banks Finding it Easier to Enter the Chilean Banking System Since 1997
When Congress Passed the General Banking Act?
Karasulu (2007) finds that regulatory barriers to bank entry in Chile are among
the lowest by international standards. However, the IMF (2005) finds that the Chilean
banking system maintains capitalization levels well above the minimum regulatory
requirements and also above those in most other countries. These high levels, which
contribute to banks’ financial stability, may also act as effective entry costs,
particularly given the relatively small size of the Chilean banking system. On
average, a one percent market share (in terms of non-risk weighted assets) in the
Chilean banking system costs about 8 percent more in equity capital. When adjusted
for banking risks, the premium for Chile is about 10 percent higher than on average in
the other countries.
In the existing literature, Levine and Carkovic (2002) conduct a study of
Chilean banks between 1976 and 1998 and find that while foreign banks could enter
Chile, they were required to purchase a domestic bank to enter; they could not simply
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apply and receive a new banking license. The new General Banking Act14 passed in
1997 was designed to help loosen the tight restrictions on bank entry, improve
competition, and lower concentration.
According to SBIF, eleven new foreign banks have entered the Chilean
banking system since 2000. Although four foreign banks did purchase a domestic
bank to enter the system, seven other banks entered the market as de novo operations.
The seven banks that entered the market as de novo operations compete with local
banks in niche markets such as investment banking, retail, and short-term company
financing. It appears that many of these new banks have started to add additional
products and services since inception. The niche market(s) that each bank set out to
compete in continues to be their dominant line of business at least, for now. It is still
unclear if Chile will allow a new de novo bank to open its doors as a full service
commercial bank in the future.
Chile may not be experiencing concentration across all sectors of its economy.
My research shows that only domestic banks are experiencing concentration; at least,
for the top 5 largest domestic banks from 2001-2013. Foreign banks are not
experiencing concentration for this same time period. Further research is needed to
determine which sectors these domestic banks dominant. Chile can continue to place
niche banks in highly concentrated sectors of the banking system to increase
competition and lower concentration, but only in those sectors of the economy. Thus,
the rest of the banking system would not be disrupted. I theorize that it is the
establishment of niche banks placed in selectively concentrated sectors of the
economy that has led to the decrease of concentration in those sectors of the economy
and perhaps has led to lower concentration overall in the Chilean banking system.
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Diversification of the banking system with the establishment of niche banks can lead
to the reduction of bank concentration when placed in selectively highly concentrated
sectors of the economy. Further, diversification allows for increased competition in
those sectors without affecting the other sectors of the economy and the overall health
of the banking system.

____________
14

See the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions - Chile for more information about the General Banking Act of

1997.
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CHAPTER III
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the determinants of bank interest rate spreads for both
domestic and foreign Banks in the Chilean banking system from 2001-2013. Using
the Backward and Forward Stepwise Selection method to construct my panel
regressions, I compare my findings to those of Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) and
other author(s) who have studied the impact that foreign banks have had on domestic
bank spreads and concentration in the Chilean banking system, previously.
I find that non-performing loans for both domestic and foreign banks lead to
higher bank spreads. I find also, that administrative costs are no longer significant for
all banks from 2001-2013. Many research papers have theorized that foreign banks
help domestic banking systems to become more efficient over time. It appears that
domestic banks in Chile have become more efficient since 2000. It’s certainly
possible that the theory holds for the Chilean domestic banking system today.
Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) and others find that higher bank
concentration raises spreads significantly for all banks in Chile from 1995-2000.
Although, I find that bank concentration raises spreads significantly for domestic
banks; I find also, that bank concentration does not raise spreads significantly for
foreign banks in Chile from 2001-2013. Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find also,
that the top-5 banks with the largest share of loans is significant at the 1 percent level
for domestic banks in Chile from 1995-2000. I find that the top-5 banks with the
largest share of loans is significant at the 10 percent level for domestic banks from
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2001-2013. It’s possible that the establishment of niche banks has lead to the
reduction of bank concentration in those sectors of the Chilean economy that were
highly concentrated from 1995-2000. Thus, leading to a small reduction (significance
went from 1 percent to 10 percent) in concentration overall, for domestic banks from
2001-2013. Further research is needed to determine if diversification is still working
to reduce concentration over the next decade in the Chilean banking system.
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
(Even years)

Table 1. Chile’s Macroeconomic Indicators.
2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Annual GDP Growth (%)

2.2

6.0

4.4

3.3

5.8

5.4

National Savings Rate (%)

21.9

22.8

25.3

22.3

24.1

21.4

Per Capita Income ($US)

4487

6224

9371

10686

12682

15246

Inflation (%)

4.2

7.5

12.8

0.5

8.8

1.3

Real Interest Rates (%)

3.4

-2.2

-4.3

12.7

-3.7

8.6

Source: World Bank

Table 2. Chile’s Overall, Fiscal, Monetary, and Government Spending Scores.
2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Fiscal

74

78.5

78.6

78.1

77.5

77.4

Gov’t Spending

82.7

81.5

87.5

88.2

89.6

82.1

Monetary

82.7

84.2

86.9

78.8

73.0

85.6

Source: The Heritage Foundation
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Table 3. Financial Soundness Indicators.
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Regulatory Capital to Risk-

14.0

15.1

12.5

12.5

14.1

13.3

Tier 1 Capital

11.1

11.9

9.3

9.6

10.1

10.0

Non-Performing Loans

2.0

1.2

0.7

1.0

2.7

2.2

ROA

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.0

1.5

1.4

ROE

14.4

16.7

18.6

13.2

18.5

17.3

Liquidity

18.7

18.9

16.8

17.5

20.5

13.3

Weighted Assets

Source: IMF Chile: Financial system stability assessment 2004
IMF Chile: Financial system stability assessment 2011
IMF Chile: Country Report Chie No. 14/218. 2014
Central Bank of Chile
World Bank
Author’s calculations

Table 4. Chile’s Banking System.
2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Total number of banks

24

26

25

24

24

23

Number of foreign banks

14

13

13

13

13

12

Foreign bank share of loans (%)

44.1

39.1

41.3

47.9

46.5

47.0

Top-3 bank share of loans (%)

52.8

52.6

51.8

45.9

44.7

44.5

Top-5 bank share of loans (%)

69.6

71.4

72.1

64.3

63.5

62.6

Source: Superintendence of Banks
Author's calculations
A foreign bank is defined to have at least 50 percent foreign ownership.
Note: The total number of foreign banks excludes Banco Estado, Chile’s
National Bank.
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